


















1 Deontic logic is multivalent. According to some theories there are more than the four deontic statuses mentioned 
in the text, hence the ‘and so on’. 
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That	does	not	sit	well	with	many	people’s	foundational	moral	intuitions.2	Many	DCTists	resolve	this	dilemma	by	appealing	to	God’s	nature.	They	argue	that	God’s	nature	necessarily	exemplifies	or	insantiates	certain	properties	like	lovingkindness	and	that	these	properties	in	turn	ensure	that	God	would	never	command	something	terrible	like	the	torture	of	innocent	children.	This	approach	is	most	closely	associated	with	the	work	of	Robert	Adams	(1999),	though	it	has	been	defended	by	others	(e.g.	Alston	1991;	Quinn	2006).			 The	upshot	is	a	more	complex	understanding	of	the	possible	relationships	between	God	and	moral	facts.	God’s	commands	are	now	thought	to	ground	a	limited	set	of	moral	facts,	most	typically	the	fact	that	some	actions	are	obligatory,	while	other	aspects	of	God’s	nature	are	thought	to	account	for	other	moral	facts.	Wielenberg	(2014)	offers	a	useful	categorisation	of	these	theories.	He	argues	that	there	is	a	general	category	of	theological	stateist	theories	which	hold	that	moral	facts	are	dependent	for	their	existence	on	one	or	more	of	God’s	states	(e.g.	values	might	be	said	to	be	dependent	on	God’s	essential	nature);	within	this	general	category	there	is	a	more	discrete	category	of	theological	voluntarist	theories,	which	hold	that	moral	facts	are	dependent	for	their	existence	on	one	or	more	of	God’s	voluntary	acts	(e.g.	his	intending	or	willing	that	X	be	so);	and	finally,	within	the	category	of	voluntarist	theories,	there	is	the	even	more	circumscribed	category	of	DCTs,	which	focus	specifically	on	God’s	commands.			 Taking	this	onboard,	in	this	article	I	assume	that	all	DCTs	are	relatively	narrow	in	scope.	They	focus	solely	on	the	relationship	between	God’s	commands	and	moral	facts.	And,	in	light	of	the	responses	to	the	Euthyphro	dilemma,	they	only	really	focus	on	one	type	of	moral	fact,	namely	obligations.	They	try	to	argue	that	moral	obligations	are	grounded	in	God’s	commands	(Adams	1999;	Quinn	2006).	The	essence	of	the	DCT	is	thus	that	without	a	divine	command	there	would	be	no	moral	obligation.	Adams	(1999)	is	most	explicit	about	this	commitment,	holding	that	a	divine	command	is	essential	because	without	it	there	would	be	no	discernible	difference	between	a	supererogatory	act	(one	that	is																																																									
2 Though whether we should trust those intuitions is a separate question. See Joyce 2002 for an analysis and 
critique of the Euthyphro dilemma. 
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above	and	beyond	the	call	of	moral	duty)	and	an	obligatory	one.	I	will	return	to	this	feature	of	Adams’s	theory	below,	but	even	if	some	DCTists	reject	this	particular	claim	concerning	the	necessity	of	the	divine	command	for	distinguishing	between	supererogations	and	obligations,	I	believe	they	will	accept	the	dependency-relationship	between	obligations	and	divine	commands.			 It	is	this	dependency-relationship	that	gives	rise	to	the	epistemological	objection.	Put	most	simply,	this	objection	holds	that	certain	classes	of	moral	agent	(specifically,	reasonable	non-believers)	lack	epistemic	access	to	God’s	commands.	In	other	words,	they	do	not	know	or	cannot	reasonably	be	expected	to	know,	what	God	has	commanded.	The	result	is	that,	if	the	DCT	is	true,	then	for	this	class	of	moral	agents,	moral	obligations	no	longer	exist.	It	is,	however,	wrong	to	suppose	that	reasonable	non-believers	have	no	moral	obligations.	Consequently,	something	must	be	rotten	at	the	heart	of	the	DCT.	That’s	the	essence	of	the	epistemological	objection.			 There	is	some	confusion	as	to	whether	this	objection	is	strictly	epistemological	(Peoples	2011)	or	ontological	in	nature	(Wielenberg	2014).	There	is	also	some	confusion	as	to	how	serious	the	objection	really	is	(Peoples	2011).	I	hope	to	clear	up	this	confusion	in	what	follows.	I	will	argue	that	the	objection	is	both	epistemological	and	ontological	in	nature,	and	that	it	can	be	quite	serious.	This	is	because	there	is	an	important	connection	between	epistemology	and	ontology	in	the	DCT	(and,	indeed,	in	most	metaethical	theories);	and	the	significance	of	this	depends	largely	on	what	type	of	theist	you	are.	To	facilitate	making	these	arguments,	I	will	work	with	the	following	simple	and	generalised	version	of	the	objection.	This	version	formalises	some	of	the	preceding	discussion	and	is	relatively	abstract	and	non-committal	in	its	scope.	This	contrasts	it	with	previous,	narrower	versions	(Morriston	2009):		 (1)	DCTs,	either	explicitly	or	implicitly,	include	an	epistemic	condition	in	their	account	of	moral	obligations,	viz.	you	must	either	know	or	successfully	receive	communication	(implying	knowledge)	of	divine	commands	in	order	for	you	to	be	morally	bound.		
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	(2)	There	are	such	things	as	reasonable	non-believers	(i.e.	non-believers	who	do	not	violate	any	epistemic	duties	in	their	non-belief)	and	for	these	reasonable	non-believers	(RNBs),	satisfaction	of	the	epistemic	condition	of	DCT	is	not	possible.		(3)	Therefore,	on	DCT,	there	are	no	moral	obligations	for	reasonable	non-believers.		In	the	remainder	of	the	article	I	clarify	and	defend	the	two	premises	of	this	argument,	and	assess	its	overall	implications.				













4 This particular list of moral platitudes is taken, with some modifications, from Beyleveld 1991. 
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plausible	grounding	can	be	found	(Joyce	2002	and	2006)	and	others	arguing	that	the	best	we	can	hope	for	is	a	theory	that	accounts	for	a	majority	of	them	and	so	wins	out	because	it	has	the	most	‘plausibility	points’	(Enoch	2011).			 Who	wins	the	war	is	not	hugely	important	in	the	present	context.	What	is	important	is	that	the	DCT	will	be	much	less	likely	to	win	the	war	if	it	excludes	an	epistemic	condition.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	most	widely-accepted	lists	of	the	key	moral	platitudes	–	particularly	those	relating	to	moral	obligations	–include	conditions	that	either	explicitly	or	implicitly	require	epistemic	access	to	the	demands	of	morality.	There	are	two	illustrations	of	this.	One	is	that	it	is	widely-agreed	that	moral	obligations	are	action-guiding	and	motivationally	salient.	That	is	to	say,	they	have	some	sort	of	effect	on	how	we	choose	to	behave	(even	if	they	do	not	completely	overwhelm	our	other	internal	reasons	for	action).	It	is	not	clear	how	moral	obligations	could	have	these	properties	if	the	people	to	whom	they	are	directed	lack	epistemic	access	to	their	content.	Similarly,	there	is	the	widely-accepted	Kantian	maxim	that	‘ought	implies	can’.	This	suggests	that	in	order	for	something	to	count	as	a	moral	obligation	we	must	have	the	ability	to	follow	it.	This	‘ability’	consists	in	the	power	to	control	one’s	actions	in	the	way	specified	by	the	obligation	and	also,	crucially,	the	ability	to	know	what	the	obligation	demands.5	So	an	epistemic	condition	looks	like	it	would	be	an	important	part	of	any	plausible	list	of	moral	platitudes,	and	hence	something	that	any	sound	metaethical	grounding	for	moral	obligations	would	account	for.				 This	importance	is	reinforced	by	the	fact	that	the	absence	of	a	plausible	account	of	moral	epistemology	is	at	the	heart	of	one	of	the	most	contentious	contemporary	debates	in	metaethics:	the	debate	between	realists	and	antirealists.	Recent	years	have	witnessed	a	resurgence	in	defences	of	non-natural	moral	realism	(e.g.	Shafer-Landau	2003;	Parfit	2011;	Enoch	2011;	Wielenberg	2014).	According	to	this	theory,	moral	facts,	including	both	values																																																									
5 For a defence of the claim that ‘ought implies can’ also implies knowledge, see Howard-Snyder 1997. In that 
paper, Howard-Snyder specifically critiques objective consequentialism, arguing that people cannot follow the 
core imperative of objective consequentialism because they don’t always know which action produces the best 
consequences. This view has been criticized on the grounds that Howard-Snyder confuses know-how with know-
that in her argument (Andríc 2016). But even defenders of this criticism concede that know-which (i.e. knowledge 
of which actions are required by a given moral principle) is essential to the ‘ought implies can’ maxim (Andríc 




6 Not least because DCT is itself a species of non-natural moral realism, albeit slightly different from the version 








7 Schellenberg now prefers the term nonresistant nonbelief for reasons we will not get into. We stick with the term 
reasonable nonbelief on the grounds that it is still being used in the literature on the epistemological objection to 
DCT (e.g. Morriston 2009; Peoples 2011; and Wielenberg 2014). 
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of	reasonable	nonbelievers.	The	third	reason	I	have	little	to	say	in	defence	of	their	existence	is	that	I	think	the	argument	may	not	be	limited	to	them	anyway.	As	will	become	clear	in	the	discussion	below,	I	also	think	that	there	are	particular	classes	of	believers	who	are	vulnerable	to	the	same	problem.	Nevertheless,	I	keep	the	scope	limited	to	reasonable	non-believers	at	the	outset	because	I	think	the	best	case	can	be	made	in	relation	to	them.			 This	brings	us	to	the	second	part	of	premise	(2).	This	is	perhaps	the	most	crucial	element	of	the	argument	and	the	one	upon	which	most	attention	has	focused.	The	prima	facie	defence	of	it	is	straightforward:	reasonable	non-believers	do	not	believe	in	God.	Consequently,	they	cannot	interpret	anything	in	the	world	as	being	a	command	emanating	from	God.	To	take	an	obvious	example,	they	do	not	believe	that	Bible	is	the	divinely	inspired	word	of	God.	Thus,	they	cannot	believe	that	the	ten	commandments	are	really	divine	commands.	Consequently,	they	do	not	know	that	these	are	moral	obligations	(if	indeed	they	are).	This	is	just	an	example.	According	to	premise	(2),	any	candidate	moral	obligation	under	DCT	will	fall	foul	of	the	same	basic	problem.			 Theists	have	developed	responses	to	this	prima	facie	defence.	These	defences	typically	start	out	by	arguing	for	an	enriched	understanding	of	the	possible	forms	of	divine	communication.	God,	we	are	told,	need	not	simply	communicate	to	us	via	a	revealed	text,	he	can	also	communicate	to	us	via	conscience,	moral	intuition,	natural	law	(all	understood	as	forms	of	general	revelation)	and	special	revelation.8	Once	we	have	this	enriched	understanding	of	the	forms	of	communication,	we	can	start	to	see	how	it	is	possible	for	a	reasonable	non-believer	to	acquire	the	requisite	moral	knowledge.	Two																																																									
8 Several authors make this point about the diverse forms of divine communication. Peoples (2011) summarises 
the contributions to the debate. See also Evans (2013), pp 37-45 on the different ways in which God’s commands 
may be promulgated. As one of the anonymous reviewers to this paper pointed out, missing from the list provided 
in the text are Kant’s suggested methods for using reason to arrive at moral knowledge in the Groundwork on the 
Metaphysics of Morals (2012/1785 at 4: 401-402 and 4:421-424) and Critique of Practical Reason (2015/1788 at 
5:25). The Kantian method would seem to deliver moral obligations as dictates/commands of reason. But it is 
noteworthy in this regard that Kant did not think that the moral law had an author. He thought God had a role to 
play in morality, but that it was a regulative/practical role, not a constitutive/grounding role. He argued that we 
needed to postulate God in order to make it practical to attain the highest good (2015/1788 at 5: 113-132), but that 
the content of the moral law itself was grounded solely in reason. This Kantian view of God’s role in the moral 
order is different from the one being targeted by the epistemological objection. On this interpretation of Kant’s 
































10 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to engage with this aspect of Evans’s argument. 
Minor textual note: Evans refers to the epistemological objection as the ‘promulgation objection’. The 







11 There is of course one crucial difference between the cases, but this merely strengthens the epistemological 
objection to DCT. Organic food will continue to be organic food even if it is mislabeled. But on DCT, a moral 
obligation will not continue to be a moral obligation unless it is successfully communicated and, according to what 








12 One of the reviewers to this paper suggested that when considering the alleged status of a moral obligation under 
DCT “[t]he RNB can still examine the commands and properties of the alleged God of DCT, and can even 
specifically consider the claim that God has employed conscience or natural law to communicate his moral will, as 
well as verbal commands.” This suggests a scenario in which the RNB is at least open to God as a possible source. 
Is being open to this possibility enough to generate knowledge of an obligation? That’s they question pursued in 








13 This phrasing seems crucial. It suggests that, within the thought experiment, there is a live epistemic possibility 
that the commands come from some particular source. 
14 Linguistic philosophers distinguish between semantics, which has to do with the general conventional meanings, 







15 Obviously these figures are misleadingly precise. No one could accurately estimate the truth of their moral 
beliefs like this. In reality, we would have to estimate subjective probability ranges. The precise figures are used 
for illustrative purposes only. 
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Moral	uncertaintists	argue	that	similar	reasoning	applies	to	Rotimi’s	case.	But	in	that	case	the	uncertainty	is	directly	related	to	moral	beliefs,	not	factual	ones.16	Rotimi	is	not	sure	about	the	ethical	status	of	eating	meat.	It	could	be	permissible	but	it	could	also	be	gravely	morally	wrong.	In	that	context,	the	uncertaintist	will	argue	that	she	ought	not	to	run	the	moral	risk	of	doing	something	that	could	be	gravely	morally	wrong.	She	should	take	the	less	risky	option.			 The	Rotimi	example	highlights	an	argumentative	structure	that	is	common	throughout	the	literature	on	moral	uncertainty,	something	we	can	call	the	risk	asymmetry	argument	(Weatherson	2014;	Moller	2011).	The	gist	of	the	argument	is	that	when	an	agent	is	faced	with	two	or	more	options,	one	of	which	has	a	non-negligible	probability	of	being	gravely	morally	wrong,	the	other	of	which	is	pretty	certain	to	be	morally	permissible,	they	ought	not	take	the	potentially	gravely	morally	wrong	option.	If	this	sounds	somewhat	similar	to	the	argumentative	structure	underlying	Pascal’s	Wager,	then	be	reassured:	it	is	effectively	a	moral	version	of	it.			 Evans’s	thought	experiment	can	be	reinterpreted	in	light	of	the	concepts	and	argumentative	structures	used	in	the	debate	about	moral	uncertainty.	The	thought	experiment	focuses	on	a	scenario	in	which	(a)	there	is	some	uncertainty	regarding	the	moral	status	of	a	sign	(i.e.	whether	it	is	obligation-imposing)	and	(b)	where	uncertainties	with	respect	to	the	moral	status	of	the	sign	are	sufficiently	asymmetrical	to	generate	a	moral	obligation	to	follow	the	sign.	In	the	case	of	the	sign	on	the	Iran-Iraq	border,	the	uncertainty	stems	from	uncertainty	with	respect	to	the	origin	or	source	of	the	sign.	One	might	argue	that	this	isn’t	really	moral	uncertainty	at	all	since	the	truth	regarding	the	origin	or	source	of	the	sign	is	factual	in	nature,	not	moral.	But	that	isn’t	quite	right.	Although	the	distinction	between	factual	and	moral	beliefs	is	fuzzy,	the	whole	point	of	the	Iran-Iraq	thought	experiment	is	that	the	source	of	a	command	determines	its	normative	status.	If	it	comes	from	a	legitimate	authority,	it	is	obligation-imposing;	if	it	does	not	come	from	a	legitimate	authority,	it	is	not.	The	concept	of																																																									
16 Of course, some people will argue that moral beliefs are factual since moral propositions are capable of being 
true or false. I don’t dispute this and although I think the distinction between the moral and the non-moral is fuzzy, 




17 It is certainly no different than the kind of uncertainty regarding whether a foetus is a person or a non-human 
animal an entity with the right not to killed for our consumption. Uncertainty with respect to those kinds of beliefs 
is accepted as an example of moral uncertainty in the existing literature (Moller 2011). That said, I readily 
acknowledge that some critics of moral uncertainty think there are subtle distinctions between moral and non-
moral facts that may make a crucial difference in this debate (e.g. Harman 2015 and Weatherson 2014). Since I 
ultimately appeal to the views of these critics in the response to Evans, I don’t believe that my view is in tension 
with theirs. 
18 The thought experiment also layers prudential risk on top of legal/moral risk, with the risk asymmetries working 
in the same way. This makes it doubly compelling. 
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	 Consider	how	the	reasoning	would	apply	to	the	case	of	the	reasonable	non-believer.	The	idea,	presumably,	would	be	that	the	nonbeliever	is	also	confronted	with	a	sign	(e.g.	a	pang	of	conscience,	or	an	utterance	from	a	holy	book	or	a	preacher	etc);	and	that	they	are	uncertain	as	to	the	true	source	of	that	sign.	They	are	reasonably	confident	(say	90%)	that	it	does	not	come	from	a	being	with	legitimate	authority	to	create	commands	(i.e.	God)	but	they	accept	that	there	is	a	non-negligible	probability	that	it	does	(say	10%).	The	claim	then	would	probability	of	the	sign	coming	from	the	right	source	is	sufficient	for	the	reasonable	nonbeliever	to	know	that	they	are	under	an	obligation	and	that	this	in	turn	is	sufficient	to	satisfy	the	epistemic	condition	of	DCT.19				 The	are	four	problems	with	this	as	an	attempt	to	ward	off	the	epistemological	objection.	The	first	is	theological	in	nature.	I	think	it	is	questionable	whether	this	sort	of	uncertainty-based	view	of	communication	is	compatible	with	the	properties	of	God	as	traditionally	conceived.	One	would	presume	that	God	has	the	power	to	communicate	clearly	to	us	that	he	is	the	source	of	a	particular	sign;	just	as	our	local	legislature	has	the	power	to	do	the	same.	The	fact	that	he	does	not,	for	at	least	some	people,	and	that	he	consequently	has	to	leverage	uncertainty	in	the	manner	just	outlined	seems	surprising.	The	theist	owes	us	some	justification/explanation	for	why	God	has	to	adopt	such	an	imperfect	system	of	communication.	Theists	will	no	doubt	oblige	by	offering	explanations	that	are	broadly	similar	to	those	provided	in	response	to	the	problem	of	evil	or	the	problem	of	divine	hiddenness	(e.g.	Evans	2013,	114-115).	But	there	is	one	problem	with	all	such	attempts	to	explain	away	the	uncertainty.	Remember	what	is	at	stake	if	the	epistemic	condition	is	not	satisfied?	Moral	obligations	cease	to	exist	for	a	certain	segment	of	the	population.	The	theist	needs	to	explain	why	God	is	entitled	to	run	the	risk	of	excluding	people	from	the	realm.of	moral	duty.	For	instance,	a	typical	theodical	response	to	the	problem	of	evil	is	to	argue	that	God	cannot	intervene	to	prevent	evil	because	it	would	compromise	our	ability	to	develop	and	acquire	true	moral	agency,	where	this	agency	consists	in	the	ability	to	recognise	right	or	wrong,	freely																																																									
19 This interpretation of the argument subsumes the preceding pragmatic enrichment interpretation because what is 
now being alleged is that uncertainty with respect to the pragmatic context is sufficient for successful 
















20 To be clear, I do not accept here that DCT is otherwise internally coherent in its account of moral ontology. 
There are other objections one can make. I merely grant this possibility arguendo.	
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